Syrian Oil and the Inevitable Battle for Stability  

As swift and surprising as the fall of the Assad regime was, rebuilding a new Syria—which has suffered for more than a decade from war and destruction—faces enormous challenges, most notably the rehabilitation and reform of the Syrian energy sector, particularly the management of the oil resources. This article provides insights into what Syrian oil represents, the strategic importance of energy security, and its pivotal role in Syria’s recovery and stability.

The importance of oil from a national security perspective

Despite the rapid steps and intensive efforts of global power and countries worldwide to reduce dependence on oil and shift towards renewable energy in what is known as the energy transition, oil is still the most politically important of the various energy sources. Comparing oil with other types of fuel – whether fossil or renewable – reveals the specificity of oil, and considering natural gas, coal, solar energy, wind energy, and hydropower, they are all used primarily to generate electricity, which means that all types of fuel except oil can be alternatives to each other in cases of high prices for one type of fuel or a decline in its production (Colgan, 2021).

While the last decade has seen the development and availability of non-fossil sources of vehicle fuel, such as electric vehicle batteries, which may eventually become dominant in the transportation sector, this transition is expected to take decades due to significant technological, economic, and geopolitical challenges, as well as these non-fossil alternatives remain unsuitable and far from being practical for military vehicles. As a result, oil continues to be the primary fuel for various forms of military and civilian transportation, including cars, trucks, aircraft, and shipping, which means that oil is still the most closely linked to the economies of countries and actors around the globe, particularly in the military and security sectors. Therefore, we could conclude that securing oil supplies is a fundamental pillar of national security and one of the major drivers of wars and conflicts, with between a quarter and a half of the wars that have broken out since 1973 being linked to oil (Colgan, 2013).

Syrian oil between the past and present

Syria was not a major oil exporter, but it maintained self-sufficiency and exported surplus production before 2011. Recently, however, Syria has struggled to meet its domestic oil needs. Syria’s oil production before 2011 was about 400,000 barrels per day, which was enough for its needs, that did not exceed half of this production. It is also worth noting that Syria’s oil production in the 1980s and 1990s had witnessed a boom period, with daily production reaching 600,000 barrels per day (Mushalik, 2015). However, the long years of conflict, and the transformation of Syria’s oil fields into a side battlefield that many parties sought to seize to secure vital sources of spending and armament, led to severe damage to the oil infrastructure, which led to a sharp decline in production levels.

Syria’s current oil production is estimated at around 80,000 barrels per day (Pearcey, 2024), with around 90% of this coming from oil-rich regions in northeastern Syria, currently controlled by Kurdish groups operating under the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As a result, oil production from areas under the control of the Syrian regime has only exceeded 15,000 to 20,000 barrels per day in recent years and combined with international sanctions including the US’ Caesar Act (U.S. Department of State, 2020) and EU, UK, and Australian sanctions that impose strict restrictions on oil imports and exports (Demarais, 2024), the old Syrian regime has been heavily dependent on oil imports from Iran to meet domestic needs.

According to the World Bank, the Syrian regime imported more than half of the oil consumed in 2022. The volume of oil imports has certainly increased significantly over the past two years due to the continued decline in the efficiency of the oil infrastructure and the increase in domestic consumption. The losses of the Syrian oil sector during the years of conflict are estimated at 100 billion U.S. dollars according to statistics from the old regime, which may lack accuracy (Xinhua, 2023), but the size of the economic losses due to the decline in oil production is difficult to ignore. While oil revenues represented between five and seven percent of GDP before 2011 (Bartu & Ruttimann, 2021), the severe decline in oil production has significantly contributed to the contraction of GDP by over 80% since 2011, (Shaar & Fève, 2024).

Syrian oil between Kurdish control and U.S. administration

Syria’s largest oil fields are concentrated in the northeast of the country, where the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control the region. Oil production from that area accounts for up to 90% of Syria’s total oil. The most important fields under Kurdish control include the two largest oil fields in Syria, including the Sweidiyeh field and the Rumeilan field, where the SDF command is based. Kurdish groups also control the most important fields in the central region, including Al-Omar field, which is Syria’s third largest oil field, and the Conoco field. The relatively small oil and gas fields in the central region, the Countryside of Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa remained under the control of the Syrian regime.

Due to international sanctions imposed on Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces are unable to sell oil legally or through official channels and instead resort to pumping oil at low prices through illegal routes under US protection. Syrian oil under Kurdish control is directed to two main routes: selling it to the old Syrian regime and some opposition-controlled areas, or smuggling the bulk of the oil out of Syria via the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The latter route does not appear to represent the final destination of smuggled Syrian oil, as oil trucks from some fields such as Al-Omar and Conoco head to the Kar refinery in Erbil, northern Iraq, for refining and export to Israel, (Sahiounie, 2024).

The annual income of the Syrian Democratic Forces from oil sold to the old Syrian regime and Iraqi Kurdistan is estimated at around 1.2 U.S. dollars billion (Anadolu Ajansı, 2024), taking into account the lack of accurate statistics on the volume of oil exported and its prices due to ongoing smuggling operations. However, smuggling oil, even at low prices, certainly provides huge profits for the Syrian Democratic Forces, which enables them to manage the part of the Syrian territory under their control and, more importantly, promote their relations with Israel and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

In addition to the stated motives of the United States for its presence in northern Syria, which includes supporting Kurdish groups and countering ISIS, there is another undeclared incentive that was not far from Syrian oil, as Washington sought to prevent either the regime or Syrian factions from monopolizing the abundant and lucrative oil in northeastern Syria. Washington also aimed to reduce the direct financial assistance to the Kurds by providing another indirect path through the Kurds smuggling Syrian oil under American protection, which provides the Kurds with significant revenue to spend on armament and civil administration of the areas under their control.

But more importantly, the US presence east of Euphrates has been a major factor in ensuring that Israel obtains significant supplies of its oil needs from Iraqi Kurdistan, including smuggled Syrian oil. In fact, it was no coincidence that Israel received its first major shipment of seaborne crude oil from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 2014, the same time that US forces arrived in Syria, (Sahiounie, 2024). By 2015, Israel was receiving more than three-quarters of its oil needs from Iraqi Kurdistan (Financial Times, 2015).

It was also no coincidence that the US military bases in Syria are strategically deployed along the eastern belt of the country, which includes most of the oil-rich areas. The largest US military base in Syria is located in the vicinity of Al-Omar oil field in Deir ez-Zor Governorate, and the U.S. base Rumalyn in Al-Hasakah Governorate is located near Syria’s largest oil fields. US President Trump’s statements in 2019 were clearer about the reasons for the US presence in Syria when he announced the withdrawal of US forces except for those securing Syrian oil fields. Trump went so far as to explicitly state that Washington “may have to fight for the oil”, (NPR, 2019).

This perspective provides more clarity about the American presence in northern Syria and the smuggling of Syrian oil to Israel, which makes controlling the fields of northeastern Syria, particularly under current conditions, a key motive for Washington’s continued troop presence in post-Assad Syria. The U.S. objective is not solely to prevent factions or any actors that Washington does not trust from reaching the strategic oil fields, but more importantly, to secure Israeli oil supplies at a time when the latter is suffering from the difficulty of receiving seaborne oil via the Red Sea due to the continuous Houthi attacks. This analysis also offers a more comprehensive understanding of U.S. interests in the region, indicating that Washington’s focus extends beyond Kurdish political participation and minority rights to include the management of northeastern Syria’s oil fields and determining the future recipients of Syrian oil.

A future vision for the Syrian oil sector

According to the above, oil supplies -and energy in general- cannot be dealt with only from a political, economic, policy, or security perspective, energy politics is more complex than all of this and intersects with national, regional, and global security. It requires an administration aware of all these dimensions and capable of developing a coherent energy strategy that places energy security as one of the priorities of national security, balances energy security with long-term national interests, and most importantly, the strategy’s ability to confront geopolitical challenges and changes.

Rehabilitating Syria’s oil sector and, more broadly, reforming and fostering the country’s energy sector could achieve two substantial goals: (1) achieving energy security and independence by increasing domestic oil production to meet key energy needs and help solve the electricity crisis; and (2) recovering the Syrian economy, which would contribute to national reconstruction. Achieving these goals would also undermine the influence of oil exporters in Syria, thereby boosting the autonomy in political decision-making. The Syrian government must confront key challenges and take urgent, decisive steps to rehabilitate the oil sector, including the following:

Key challenges

First: Regaining the northeastern fields

Syria needs to regain full control of the oil fields in the northeastern region to secure supplies of about 65,000 barrels per day, in addition to the 20,000 barrels per day of production from the fields controlled by the government, bringing the total production to 85,000 barrels per day. This will provide Syria with almost half of its current oil needs. More importantly, controlling these fields, which represent most of Syria’s oil production, will open the way for the Syrian government to move forward in developing the oil sector, achieving self-sufficiency, and exporting abroad in the future.

Simultaneously, this challenge indicates that one of the levers of influence held by the United States in Syria extends beyond recognizing the legitimacy of the Syrian government and lifting sanctions to include control over Syrian oil, and it is understandable and expected that Washington will not easily give the keys to the oil fields in the northeast to the Syrian government except at a high political cost.

Second: Diversifying of sources

Syria will currently need to import large oil supplies to meet its needs. It is important to note that securing oil supplies through imports means links between the importer and the exporter. These links are not purely economic but also include important political and security dimensions that constitute the national security of the state as well as regional security. As Yergin (2024) points out, the best means of promoting energy security, which means “the availability of reliable and reasonably priced energy,” is the diversification of sources. In other words, it will be difficult for Syria to continue its increasing dependence on Iranian oil, which the previous Syrian regime relied on to a large extent. Instead, Syria will have to adopt a strategy of diversifying oil sources that reduces the risks of over-reliance on only one source. Taking into account the importance of lifting international sanctions, this would provide greater flexibility in importing oil from diverse sources.

This challenge of diversifying oil sources will mean that the shortest path available to Syria will certainly be Gulf oil, which gives us some answers about the Syrian government’s openness to establishing relations or rapprochement with the Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia at present. However, this path imposes another obstacle related to the demands that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states will set in exchange for securing Syrian oil supplies.

Urgent steps

First: Increasing oil production

Developing oil reserves in the Syrian oil fields currently under the control of the Syrian government by intensifying the drilling of development and exploration wells and maintaining the level of production from old wells as much as possible, in addition to repairing and maintaining the infrastructure of the oil sector; this will work to restore Syrian production levels before 2011 and will contribute to achieving self-sufficiency in oil.

Second: Shifting to renewable energy

Prioritizing investment in renewable energy, especially since it is not restricted by international sanctions like oil and gas, and is primarily based on improving living conditions rather than military applications. This approach could open the door for Chinese companies with extensive experience in renewable energy to invest in Syria. Indeed, this approach could constitute a trade-off with Washington -regarding oil in the northeastern regions- which will consider China’s participation in the Syrian energy sector as part of Beijing’s efforts to boost its influence in the Middle East.

Third: Preparing a map of foreign investment

The improvement of the political and security environment and the lifting of sanctions will be an incentive for foreign companies to return and invest again in Syria, as oil and natural gas exploration and production activities require huge investments that can be provided by international oil companies (IOCs). Therefore it is important to start now to prepare the areas and concessions that can be offered in international bid round for exploration in Syrian lands and waters. The announcement by the Syrian government of the preparation for these steps at present will be a greater incentive for Western governments to lift sanctions and allow IOCs to invest in Syria.

To conclude, working to implement the urgent steps will enhance the Syrian oil sector through three successive levels, including:

• Maintaining current production levels after the Syrian government regained control of all the oil fields.
• Achieving oil self-sufficiency after approaching pre-2011 production levels.
• Oil exporting, contributing to economic recovery, and promoting Syria’s geopolitical role in the region.

Syrian Oil and the Inevitable Battle for Stability  

References

Anadolu Ajansı. (2024). Ousted Assad regime leaves Syria, economy in ruins. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/ousted-assad-regime-leaves-syria-economy-in-ruins/3427778

Bartu, P, & Ruttimann, M. (2021). North East Syria: The Good, the Bad & the Oil. Australian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/north-east-syria-the-good-the-bad-the-oil/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Colgan, Jeff D. (2013).  “Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War.” International Security 38 (2): 147–80. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24480933

Colgan, Jeff D. (2020). “Oil and Security: The Necessity of Political Economy”. Journal of Global Security Studies, 6(1). https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa008

Demarais, A. (2024). The purpose of sanctions: Why Europe and America should begin lifting measures on Syria. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/the-purpose-of-sanctions-why-europe-and-america-should-begin-lifting-measures-on-syria/

Financial Times. (2015). Israel turns to Kurds for three-quarters of its oil supplies. https://www.ft.com/content/150f00cc-472c-11e5-af2f-4d6e0e5eda22

Mushalik, M. (2015). Syria peak oil weakened government’s finances ahead of Arab Spring in 2011. Crude Oil Peak. https://crudeoilpeak.info/syria-peak-oil-weakened-governments-finances-ahead-of-arab-spring-in-2011

NPR. (2019). Trump Announcement On Baghdadi’s Death. https://www.npr.org/2019/10/27/773842999/read-trump-statement-on-baghdadis-death

Pearcey, E. (2024). Turkey positions itself as Syria’s oil and gas saviour after fall of Assad regime. Offshore Technology. https://www.offshore-technology.com/news/turkey-positions-itself-as-syria-oil-and-gas-saviour-after-assad-fall/

Sahiounie, S. (2024). The U.S. Steals Syrian Oil, and the Kurds Sell It to Israel at a Discount in Erbil. Strategic Culture Foundation. https://strategic-culture.su/news/2024/01/22/us-steals-syrian-oil-and-kurds-sell-it-israel-at-discount-in-erbil/

Shaar, K., & Fève, B. (2024). The Path to a Better Syria: A Secure Peace Will Depend on Economic Revitalization. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/syria/path-better-syria?utm_source=dailybrief&utm_content=20241220&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2024Dec20&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief

U.S. Department of State. (2020). Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. https://2017-2021.state.gov/caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act/

World Bank. (2023). Syria Economic Monitor. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099720503172334463/pdf/IDU08b76f71b0bfa8045db09e8007c3df330e5fe.pdf

Xinhua. (2023). U.S. forces transfer “stolen Syrian oil” to bases in Iraq: media. https://english.news.cn/20231221/282c20d204dc43beaabd163363750497/c.html

Yergin, D. (2024). US Energy Security. Hoover Institution. https://www.hoover.org/research/us-energy-security